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Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: 
Evidence from Payday Lending†
By Will Dobbie and Paige Marta Skiba*
Information asymmetries are prominent in theory but difficult to esti-
mate. This paper exploits discontinuities in loan eligibility to test 
for moral hazard and adverse selection in the payday loan market. 
Regression discontinuity and regression kink approaches suggest that 
payday borrowers are less likely to default on larger loans. A $50 
larger payday loan leads to a 17 to 33 percent drop in the probability 
of default. Conversely, there is economically and statistically signifi-
cant adverse selection into larger payday loans when loan eligibility 
is held constant. Payday borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 
16 to 47 percent more likely to default. (JEL D14, D82, G21)
Theory has long emphasized the importance of private information in explaining credit-market failures. Information asymmetries and the resulting credit con-
straints have been used to explain anomalous behavior in consumption, borrowing, 
and labor supply. Motivated in part by this research, policymakers and lenders have 
experimented with various interventions to circumvent such problems. Yet, the suc-
cess of these strategies depends on which information asymmetries are empirically 
relevant. Credit scoring and information coordination can help mitigate selection 
problems, while incentive problems are better addressed by improved collection or 
repayment schemes.
This paper provides new evidence on the empirical relevance of asymmetric infor-
mation using administrative data from the payday lending market. Payday loans are 
short-term loans of $100 to $500. Loan fees average $15 to $20 per $100 of princi-
pal, implying an annual percentage rate (APR) of over 400 percent. Despite these 
high interest rates, payday lenders have more storefronts in the United States than 
McDonald’s and Starbucks combined, with nearly 19 million households receiving 
a payday loan in 2010 (Skiba and Tobacman 2011). The payday loan market is also 
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extremely high risk, with more than 19 percent of initial loans in our sample ending 
in default.
Payday borrowers are particularly vulnerable to market failures due to their 
low incomes and poor credit histories. Two-thirds of payday borrowers report not 
having applied for credit at least once in the past five years due to the anticipa-
tion of rejection, and nearly three-quarters report having been turned down by a 
lender or not given as much credit as applied for (Elliehausen and Lawrence 
2001; Io Data 2002). Payday loans also have the unique feature that delinquen-
cies are not reported to traditional credit rating agencies, and default comes with 
few penalties outside of calls from debt collection agencies. Theory suggests that 
asymmetric information problems are exacerbated by precisely these kinds of com-
mitment problems (Athreya, Tam, and Young 2009; Chatterjee et al. 2007; Livshits, 
MacGee, and Tertilt 2010; White 2007, 2009).
We identify the impact of moral hazard in the payday loan market using two sepa-
rate empirical models. The first exploits discontinuities in the relationship between 
borrower pay and loan eligibility to estimate a regression discontinuity design. Many 
payday lenders offer loans in $50 increments up to but not exceeding half of an indi-
vidual’s biweekly pay. As a result, there are loan-eligibility cutoffs around which 
very similar borrowers are offered different size loans. These institutional features 
allow us to attribute any discontinuous relationship between loan outcomes and pay 
at the loan-eligibility cutoffs to the causal impact of loan size. Our second empirical 
model uses a discontinuous change in slope relating borrower pay to loan eligibility 
to estimate a regression kink design. In this separate sample of states, payday lend-
ers offer loans in continuous increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s 
biweekly pay, capping loans for all borrowers at a state-mandated limit of either 
$300 or $500. The fact that loan amounts are offered in continuous increments up 
to these caps implies that there is a discontinuous change in the slope relating loan 
eligibility and biweekly pay at each loan cap. We use this discontinuous change 
in the slope to provide a second set of moral hazard estimates. As the correlation 
between default and loan size combines the selection and incentive effects of loan 
size, we can, under reasonable assumptions, obtain an estimate of adverse selection 
by subtracting our moral hazard estimates from the cross-sectional coefficient relat-
ing loan size and borrower default.
We begin our empirical analysis by documenting credit constraints among payday 
borrowers. Using our regression discontinuity strategy, we find that a $50 increase 
in payday credit leads to a $19.73 to $22.02 increase in average loan size. Thus, 
payday borrowers borrow 39 to 44 cents per additional dollar of credit. These esti-
mates are larger than previous findings using data from different types of debtors, 
likely reflecting the fact that payday borrowers are particularly credit constrained. 
For example, the typical credit card holder consumes $0.10 to $0.14 out of every 
additional dollar of credit (Gross and Souleles 2002), while the typical financially 
constrained household consumes $0.20 to $0.40 out of every additional dollar in 
tax-rebate amount (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006).
Surprisingly, both our regression discontinuity and regression kink empirical 
strategies suggest that relaxing these credit constraints lowers the probability that 
a payday borrower defaults. A $50 increase in payday loan size leads to a 4.4 to 
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6.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of default in our regression discon-
tinuity strategy, a 22 to 33 percent decrease. Using our regression kink design, we 
find that a $50 increase in payday loan size lowers the probability of default by 1.6 
to 4.6 percentage points, a 17 to 23 percent decrease. The finding that larger loans 
lower the rate of default is surprising given the prominence of moral hazard in the 
theoretical literature and the empirical relevance of moral hazard in other consumer 
lending markets (Adams, Einav, and Levin 2009).
Conversely, we find economically and statistically significant adverse selection 
into larger payday loans. In our OLS results, which combine both adverse selection 
and moral hazard, a $50 increase in loan size is associated with a 1.0 to 2.3 percent-
age point increase in the probability of default in our regression discontinuity sam-
ple. Taken together with our estimates of moral hazard, this suggests that borrowers 
who choose a loan that is $50 larger are 5.4 to 8.7 percentage points more likely to 
default, a 28 to 44 percent increase. In our regression kink sample, the OLS results 
suggest that borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 16 to 47 percent more likely 
to default. Our results are therefore consistent with the view that adverse selection 
alone can lead to credit constraints in equilibrium.
We conclude our analysis by examining two key threats to our interpretation of 
the regression discontinuity and regression kink estimates. The first threat is that 
individuals may opt out of borrowing if they are not eligible for a sufficiently large 
loan. Such selective borrowing could invalidate our regression discontinuity design 
by creating discontinuous differences in borrower characteristics around the eligi-
bility cutoffs. We evaluate this possibility by testing whether the density of bor-
rowers is a continuous function of the loan-eligibility cutoffs and by examining the 
continuity of observable borrower characteristics at the cutoffs. The second threat to 
our identification strategy is that our empirical design is misspecified. To ensure that 
our estimates identify discontinuities that exist solely due to institutional factors, we 
replicate our empirical results in a set of states where loan size is not a discontinuous 
function of income.
Our work fits into an important empirical literature estimating moral hazard and 
adverse selection in credit markets in the United States (Ausubel 1991; Edelberg 
2003, 2004) and abroad (Klonner and Rai 2006; Karlan and Zinman 2010). Ausubel 
(1999), for example, uses randomized credit card offers to show that a 1 percent 
increase in introductory interest rates increases the probability of delinquency by 
1.2 percentage points and the probability of bankruptcy by 0.4 percentage points. 
Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) exploit exogenous variation in price and mini-
mum down payments to identify moral hazard and adverse selection in an auto-
mobile loan market. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) estimate that for a given auto 
loan borrower, a $1,000 increase in loan size increases the probability of default by 
16 percent. Individuals who borrow an extra $1,000 for unobservable reasons have 
an 18 percent higher rate of default than those who do not. Also related is Melzer 
and Morgan (2009), who find adverse selection into bank overdraft services when 
payday lending is available.
This paper complements this literature in three ways. First, the characteristics of 
the borrowers make this a particularly important population for which to study credit 
dynamics. As previously discussed, payday borrowers are particularly vulnerable to 
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market failures given their low incomes and poor credit histories. Payday borrow-
ers apply for payday loans precisely when they have exhausted traditional credit 
options. In fact, 80 percent of payday loan applicants have no available credit on 
credit cards when they apply for a payday loan (Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman 2012). 
Second, the institutional features of the payday loan market allow for a particularly 
sharp research design. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), whose work is most closely 
related to ours, use price and down payment variation across time, credit categories, 
and regions to identify the impact of moral hazard. Their empirical design therefore 
relies on having controlled for all sources of endogenous variation. In contrast, we 
focus on two transparent and well-identified sources of variation in payday loan size 
to identify moral hazard. Third, we are the first to explore the role of information 
frictions in the payday loan market, one of the largest and fastest growing sources of 
subprime credit in the United States. Since the emergence of payday lending in the 
mid-1990s, annual loan volume has grown from approximately $8 billion in 2000 
to $44 billion in 2008. In comparison, the subprime automobile loan market totaled 
approximately $50 billion in 2006 (J.D. Power and Associates 2007).
Our paper also adds to a large literature documenting consumer credit constraints. 
The majority of this literature has inferred credit constraints from the excess sensi-
tivity of consumption to expected changes in labor income (e.g., Hall and Mishkin 
1982; Altonji and Siow 1987; Zeldes 1989; Runkle 1991; Stephens 2003, 2006, 
2008) or tax rebates (e.g., Parker 1999; Souleles 1999; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 
2006). Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) and Chetty (2008) also find excess sensitiv-
ity of job search behavior to available liquidity, which they interpret as evidence of 
liquidity constraints.
Finally, our paper is related to a rapidly expanding literature examining the 
impact of payday credit. There is evidence that loan access may help borrowers 
smooth negative shocks (Morse 2011) and avoid financial distress (Morgan, Strain, 
and Seblani 2012). On the other hand, there is also evidence that loan access may 
erode job performance (Carrell and Zinman 2008), increase bankruptcy (Skiba and 
Tobacman 2011), and lead to increased difficulty paying mortgage, rent, and utility 
bills (Melzer 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I provides back-
ground on our institutional setting and describes our data. Section II reviews the 
theoretical framework that motivates our empirical analysis. Section III describes 
our empirical strategy. Section IV presents our results. Section V discusses potential 
mechanisms through which larger payday loans lower the probability of default. 
Section VI concludes.
I. Data and Institutional Setting
Payday loans are small, short-term loans collateralized with a personal check. In 
a typical payday loan transaction, individuals fill out loan applications and present 
their most recent pay stubs, checking account statements, utility or phone bills, and 
a government-issued photo ID. Lenders use applicants’ pay stubs to infer their next 
payday and designate that day as the loan’s due date. The customer writes a check 
for the amount of the loan plus a finance charge that is typically $15 to $18 per $100 
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borrowed.1 The lender agrees to hold the check until the next payday, typically for 
about two weeks, at which time the customer redeems the check with cash or the 
lender deposits the check. A loan is in default if the check does not clear.
Payday loan eligibility is typically a discontinuous function of net pay, with the 
precise eligibility rules varying across firms and states. In our data, loan-eligibility 
rules take two forms. In the first form, loans are offered in $50 increments that are 
no larger than half of a borrower’s biweekly pay. Thus, loan eligibility increases 
discontinuously by $50 at each $100 pay interval. Stores using this rule form our 
regression discontinuity sample. A second set of stores offer loans in continuous 
increments that are no larger than half of a borrower’s biweekly pay, capping loans 
for all borrowers at a state-mandated limit of either $300 or $500. The fact that loan 
amounts are offered in continuous increments implies that there are no discontinu-
ous jumps in loan eligibility. Instead, there is a discontinuous change in the slope 
relating loan eligibility and biweekly pay at the loan limit amount. Stores using this 
eligibility rule form our regression kink sample.
Our specific data come from three large payday lenders. Lending information is 
available from January 2000 through July 2004 in 15 states for the first firm in our 
data (hereafter Firm A), from January 2008 through April 2010 in two states for the 
second firm in our data (hereafter Firm B), and from January 2008 through June 
2011 in two states for the third firm in our data (hereafter Firm C).2 We combine 
these data with records of repayment and default from each firm. This gives us 
information on borrower characteristics, loan terms, and the subsequent loan out-
comes. Our data from Firm A include information on each borrower’s income, home 
address, gender, race, age, checking account balance, and subprime credit score. 
Our data from Firms B and C are more sparse, only including information on each 
borrower’s income, home address, and age.
Our regression discontinuity sample consists of all initial loans made in four 
states that offer loans in $50 increments. This sample includes Firm A stores in Ohio 
and Tennessee and Firm B stores in Kansas and Missouri. We restrict our analysis to 
borrowers paid biweekly or semimonthly, who make up nearly 70 percent of all bor-
rowers, to allow a more straightforward presentation of the regression discontinuity 
results. Results are nearly identical including all borrowers. Finally, we restrict our 
regression discontinuity analysis to borrowers earning within $100 of a  loan eligi-
bility cutoff, or borrowers who make between $100 and $500 in Tennessee, which 
limits loans at $200, and between $100 and $1,100 in the other three states in our 
sample. These restrictions leave us with 2,350 observations from Firm A and 7,123 
observations from Firm B.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 present summary statistics for the two firms in our 
regression discontinuity sample. Weighting the mean from each firm by the num-
ber of borrowers, the typical borrower borrows $226.71 (including fees) in his first 
1 While some lenders use credit scores to screen applicants, none of the firms in our sample use risk-based pric-
ing, and all borrowers pay the same finance charge. See Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman (2009) for more informa-
tion on the subprime credit-scoring process.
2 Our data spans periods both before and after the Great Recession. Our regression discontinuity sample is too 
small to provide estimates by period. Our regression kink estimates are nearly identical for both Firm A and Firm C, 
whose data span both time periods.
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transaction and earns $682.39 every two weeks. Nineteen and a half percent of bor-
rowers default on their first loan, with the rate being more than ten percentage points 
higher for borrowers at Firm B. The higher rate of default may be due, at least in part, 
to these loans being made during the Great Recession. The more detailed data from 
Firm A show that 28.3 percent of borrowers are male and 77.8 percent are black, 
although these numbers vary widely across store locations. Just under 27 percent of 
payday borrowers in our regression discontinuity sample own a home, 25.3 percent 
use direct deposit, and 2.4 percent have their wages garnished by a creditor.
Our regression kink sample consists of all initial loans made in four states 
that offer loans in $1 or $10 increments. This sample includes Firm A stores 
in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas. The sample for Firm C includes stores in 
California and Oklahoma. Stores in California limit loans at $300, while all other 
states limit loans at $500. Following our regression discontinuity sample, we 
restrict our regression kink analysis to borrowers paid biweekly or semimonthly. 
We also drop borrowers making less than $100 each biweekly pay period and 
those making more than $1,000, the amount necessary to qualify for the largest 
available payday loan. Thus, we include borrowers making between $100 and 
$1,600 in California and $100 and $2,000 in all other states in our regression kink 
sample. These restrictions leave us with 91,806 observations from Firm A and 
38,311 observations from Firm C.
Table 1—Summary Statistics
RD sample RK sample All borrowers
Firm A Firm B Firm A Firm C Firm A Firm B Firm C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Loan amount 190.936 238.614 285.866 223.918 283.933 257.738 228.426
Biweekly pay 580.827 715.852 790.856 961.133 809.250 822.658 1229.444
Default 0.112 0.222 0.090 0.202 0.090 0.210 0.187
Ever default 0.369 0.616 0.343 0.643 0.342 0.608 0.618
Age 36.508 35.710 35.482 35.808 35.619 36.609 37.084
Male 0.283 — 0.335 — 0.336 — —
White 0.089 — 0.110 — 0.110 — —
Black 0.777 — 0.496 — 0.509 — —
Checkings 207.166 — 272.456 — 275.147 — —
Credit score 513.171 — 443.155 — 446.470 — —
Home owner 0.270 — 0.321 — 0.323 — —
Direct deposit 0.413 — 0.428 — 0.429 — —
Garnishment flag 0.025 — 0.027 — 0.027 — —
Observations 2,350 7,123 91,790 38,235 96,679 8,607 50,092
Notes: This table reports summary statistics. The regression discontinuity (RD) sample consists of first-time 
payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semi-
monthly, earning between $100 and $1,100 every two weeks. The regression kink (RK) sample consists of first-
time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or 
semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1,000 of a kink point. All borrowers are paid biweekly or semi-
monthly. Firm A data are available for 2000 to 2004. Firm B data are available for 2008 to 2010. Firm C data are 
available for 2008 to 2012. Default is an indicator for bounced payment on the first loan. Ever default is an indica-
tor for ever bouncing a payment. Checkings balance is reported via the most recent bank statement. Credit score is 
a subprime credit score calculated at the time of application by a third-party, credit-scoring agency called Teletrack. 
Direct deposit is an indicator for having one’s paycheck directly deposited into a checking account. Garnishment is 
an indicator for a creditor currently garnishing a portion of one’s wages. See text for additional details on the sam-
ple and variable construction.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 present summary statistics for our regression kink sam-
ple. Weighting the mean from each firm by the number of borrowers, the  typical bor-
rower in our regression kink sample borrows $267.64 in his first transaction, $40.93 
more than in our regression discontinuity sample, and earns $840.92 every two weeks, 
$158.53 more. Borrowers in our regression kink sample also default at a rate of 12.3 
percent, more than 7 percentage points less than the regression discontinuity sample. 
Borrowers in the regression kink sample are also less likely to be black, have lower 
credit scores, and are more likely to own a home than borrowers in the regression dis-
continuity sample. The positive selection into our regression kink sample is due to the 
sample including borrowers earning between $100 and either $1,600 or $2,000 every 
two weeks, as opposed to our regression discontinuity sample, which only includes 
borrowers earning between $100 and $1,100. Moreover, our regression kink sample 
includes more borrowers from Firm A, whose data is drawn from before the Great 
Recession when default rates were lower for all payday lending firms.
II. Conceptual Framework
Models of asymmetric information predict that information frictions will produce 
a positive correlation between loan default and the size or price of that loan.3 In the 
moral hazard version of the model, individual borrowers are more likely to default 
on larger or more expensive loans. The underlying behavioral mechanisms consis-
tent with these moral hazard models span situations whereby individuals have a 
great deal of control over their default decisions (e.g., strategic default) to situations 
where individuals have relatively little control and default is due largely to unex-
pected shocks. For instance, payday borrowers may have less incentive to repay a 
larger loan even when they have the ability to do so. This can happen if the penalties 
of default increase less quickly than the benefits of default. Borrowers will therefore 
be more likely to voluntarily default as the loan amount increases. This can lead to 
credit constraints in the payday loan market because borrowers will not internalize 
the full increase in default costs that come with larger loan sizes, with lenders need-
ing to cap loan sizes to prevent overborrowing. In this scenario, improved collection 
or repayment schemes can help relax credit constraints for all payday borrowers.
In models of adverse selection, borrowers at a high risk of default choose larger 
loans. Adverse selection may result from forward-looking borrowers anticipating 
the high likelihood of default and therefore choosing larger and more valuable loans. 
Conversely, payday borrowers that are more illiquid today and more in need of a 
larger loan may also be more likely to be illiquid later and have trouble with repay-
ment. Adverse selection of either kind will lead to credit constraints in the payday 
loan market whenever lenders cannot observe a borrower’s risk type, as lenders will 
need to deny credit to both high- and low-risk types. In this scenario, credit scoring 
3 Models of asymmetric information typically assume limited commitment by borrowers, or the idea that bor-
rowers always have the option of personal bankruptcy. An emerging literature suggests that asymmetric information 
issues are no longer relevant when limited commitment can be fully resolved (Chatterjee et al. 2007; White 2007, 
2009; Athreya, Tam, and Young 2009; Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2010).
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and information coordination can help mitigate selection problems and increase the 
supply of credit to low-risk borrowers.
It is impossible to identify the separate impact of each of these channels with our 
available data. Instead, the goal of our paper is to document the presence of liquidity 
constraints in payday lending and to assess the consequences of moral hazard and 
adverse selection in our setting. Our estimates will likely reflect a number of the 
mechanisms discussed above. In Section V, we will explore which of these mecha-
nisms is most plausible given the pattern of results.
III. Empirical Strategy
We estimate two empirical models to identify the impact of moral hazard in the 
payday loan market. The first empirical model exploits discontinuities in the rela-
tionship between net pay and loan eligibility to estimate a regression discontinuity 
design. The second empirical model uses loan limits to estimate a regression kink 
design.4
Consider the following model of the causal relationship between default ( d i ) and 
loan size ( L i ):
(1)   d i = α + γ  L i +  ε i .
The parameter of interest is γ, which measures the causal effect of loan size on 
default (e.g., moral hazard). The problem for inference is that if individuals select 
a loan size because of important unobserved determinants of later outcomes, such 
estimates may be biased. In particular, it is plausible that people who select larger 
loans have a different probability of default even if loan size is held constant: 
E [ ε i |  L i ] ≠ 0. Since  L i may be a function of default risk, this can lead to a bias in the 
direct estimation of γ using OLS.
The key intuition of our first strategy is that this bias can be overcome if the 
conditional distribution of unobserved determinants of default E [ ε i | pa y i ] trends 
smoothly through the loan-eligibility cutoffs used by payday lenders. In this sce-
nario, the distribution of unobserved characteristics of individuals who just barely 
qualified for a larger loan is the same as the distribution among those who just barely 
did not qualify:
(2)  E [ ε i | pa y i =  c l + Δ ] Δ→ 0 +  = E [ ε i | pa y i =  c l − Δ ] Δ→ 0 +  ,
where pa y i is an individual’s net pay and  c l is the eligibility cutoff for loan size l. 
Equation (2) therefore implies that the distribution of individuals to either side of 
4 A third empirical strategy to estimate the impact of moral hazard exploits the fact that payday loans in 
Tennessee are capped at $200. As a result, there is a trend break in the relationship between net pay and maximum 
loan size in Tennessee. Specifically, we can use the interaction of an indicator variable for a borrower residing in 
Tennessee and being eligible for a $200 loan with net pay as an instrumental variable. The differences in state trends 
in loan amounts and default after the $200 cutoff identifies the impact of moral hazard. Online Appendix Table 1 
reports these difference-in-differences results. The results are qualitatively similar to our preferred regression dis-
continuity and regression kink estimates.
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the cutoff is as good as random with respect to unobserved determinants of default, 
ε i . Since loan size is a discontinuous function of pay, whereas the distribution of 
unobservable determinants of default,  ε i , is, by assumption, continuous at the cut-
offs, the coefficient γ is identified. Intuitively, any discontinuous relation between 
default and net pay at the cutoffs can be attributed to the causal impact of loan size 
under the identification assumption in equation (2).
Formally, let loan size  L i be a smooth function of an individual’s pay with a dis-
continuous jump at each of nine loan-eligibility cutoffs  c l :




 λ l 1 { pa y i ≥  c l } +  η i ,
where  λ l measures the effect of loan eligibility on loan size at each of the nine cut-
offs.  λ l can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to borrow estimated by Gross 
and Souleles (2002) and others at each eligibility cutoff. We can use equation (3) 
as the first stage to estimate the average causal effect for individuals induced into 
a larger loan by earning an amount just above a cutoff. The two-stage least squares 
regression controls for the underlying relationship between pay and both default 
and loan size using f  ( pa y i ), and instruments for loan size using loan eligibility 
1 { pa y i ≥  c l } at each cutoff l.
In practice, the functional form of f  ( pa y i ) is unknown. In our empirical analysis, 
we experiment with several functional forms to control for borrower pay, including 
a seventh-order polynomial, a linear spline, and a local linear regression. To address 
potential concerns about discreteness in pay, we cluster our standard errors by pay 
(Lee and Card 2008). We also control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects in 
all specifications. Adding controls for age, gender, race, baseline credit score, and 
baseline checking account balance leaves the results essentially unchanged.
As with any regression discontinuity approach, one threat to a causal interpreta-
tion of our estimates is that individuals may opt out of borrowing if they are not eligi-
ble for a large enough loan. Such selective borrowing could invalidate our empirical 
design by creating discontinuous differences in borrower characteristics around the 
eligibility cutoffs. In Section D, we evaluate this possibility in two ways: by testing 
whether the density of borrowers is a continuous function of loan-eligibility cutoffs, 
and by examining the continuity of observable borrower characteristics around the 
cutoffs. Neither test points to the kind of selective borrowing that invalidates our 
empirical design.
A more general threat is the possibility that our regression discontinuity design 
is misspecified. To ensure that our estimates identify actual discontinuities in loan 
size and default that exist due to institutional factors, we replicate our empirical 
specifications in a set of states where loan size is not a discontinuous function of 
income. Consistent with our empirical design, we do not find a relationship between 
loan size and income or default and income around the loan-eligibility cutoffs in 
these states.
Finally, our regression discontinuity approach assumes that loan eligibility 
impacts default only through loan size. This assumes, for example, that individuals 
do not strategically repay lenders who offer higher credit lines in order to protect 
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future access to credit. If this assumption is violated, our reduced-form estimates 
represent the net impact of increasing an individual’s credit limit more generally. 
Note that Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) use the same assumption to identify the 
impact of moral hazard in the subprime auto loan market.
To complement our regression discontinuity strategy, our second statistical 
approach exploits loan limits in states that offer payday loans in relatively continu-
ous amounts. In these states, payday lenders offer loans in continuous increments 
that are no larger than half of a borrower’s biweekly pay up to a state-mandated 
limit of either $300 or $500. The fact that loan amounts are offered in continuous 
increments up to these caps implies that there is a discontinuous change in the slope 
relating loan eligibility and biweekly pay at each loan cap. We use this discontinu-
ous change in the slope to provide a second set of moral hazard estimates.
Formally, let loan size  L i be a smooth function of an individual’s pay with a dis-
continuous change in the slope after the largest available loan in a state  c max  :
(4)   L i = pa y i + π 1 { pa y i ≥  c max } ∙ pa y i +  η i ,
where π measures the effect of the loan limit on the relationship between earnings 
and loan size. Under a number of assumptions, including a monotonicity condi-
tion analogous to the standard instrumental-variables framework (Angrist, Imbens, 
and Rubin 1996), we can use equation (4) as the first stage to provide a second set 
of moral hazard estimates. The two-stage least squares regression controls for the 
underlying relationship between pay and both default and loan size using pa y i , and 
instruments for loan size using the change in slope at the loan cap 1 { pa y i ≥  c max }. 
The identified two-stage least squares parameter is a weighted average of marginal 
effects, where the weights are proportional to the magnitude of the individual-spe-
cific kinks (see Card et al. 2012 for additional details).
There are two important assumptions necessary to interpret our regression kink 
estimates as causal. Following our regression discontinuity design, the conditional 
distribution of unobserved determinants of default E[ ε i | pa y i ] must trend smoothly 
through the loan caps used by payday lenders. In addition, the conditional distribu-
tion of unobserved determinants E[ ε i | pa y i ] must be continuously differentiable in 
pay. In practice, these assumptions imply that borrowers cannot precisely change 
their income, while allowing for other less extreme forms of endogeneity, such as 
borrowers having imperfect control over their preborrowing earnings.
Similar to our regression discontinuity approach, the identifying assumptions 
required by the regression kink design generate strong predictions for the distribu-
tion of predetermined covariates around the loan caps. Following our robustness 
checks for our regression discontinuity design, we test our regression kink design in 
two ways: by testing whether the density of borrowers is a continuous function of 
kink point, and by examining the continuity of observable borrower characteristics 
at the kink point. There is no evidence that the number of borrowers changes at the 
kink point, with the results from Section IVD ruling out even modest selection in or 
out of the sample around the kink point. However, there are some small changes in 
the observable characteristics of borrowers around the kink points. Thus, our regres-
sion kink estimates should be interpreted with these changes in mind.
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A simple extension of our regression discontinuity and regression kink approach, 
first pioneered by Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), allows us to estimate the magni-
tude of selection in our sample. Recall that a cross-sectional regression of default on 
loan size combines both selection and incentive effects. By subtracting our estimate 
of moral hazard from the cross-sectional coefficient on loan size, we obtain an esti-
mate of selection. It is important to note that this approach assumes that our estimate 
of moral hazard is the relevant estimate for the full population. There are nine cutoffs 
in our sample and this assumption would be violated if borrowers right around these 
eligibility cutoffs have a different marginal return to credit than other borrowers.
IV. Results
A. The Impact of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount
Figure 1, panels A– C present regression discontinuity estimates of the impact 
of loan eligibility on loan amount. Each figure plots average loan amounts in 
$25 income bins for the first loans of borrowers with biweekly take-home pay 
between $100 and $1,100. Figure 1, panel A plots fitted values from a regression 
of loan size on a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. That is, the fitted values for 
Figure 1, panel A come from the following specification:




 α 1l 1 { pa y i ≥  c l } +  ∑ 
p=1
7
  β 1p pa y i p +  ε i ,
where  α 1l is the effect of having a biweekly income above the cutoff for each loan 
size l.
Figure 1, panel B plots fitted values from a linear spline specification:




 ( α 1l 1 { pa y i ≥  c l } +  β 1l 1 { pa y i ≥  c l } ∙ ( pa y i −  c l ) ) +  ε i .
Figure 1, panel C stacks data from each cutoff and controls for pay with a linear 
trend interacted with the loan-eligibility cutoff:
(7)   ˆ  L i =  α 0 +  α 1 1 { pa y i ≥ c} +  β 1 ( pa y i − c) 
 +  β 2  ( 1 { pa y i ≥ c} ∙ ( pa y i − c) ) +  ε i ,
where  α 1 is the impact of having an income above the loan-eligibility cutoff. To nor-
malize the loan amounts across the nine cutoffs, Figure 1, panel C plots residualized 
loan amounts  ˆ  L i from a regression of raw loan size on cutoff fixed effects. All three 
figures exclude borrowers from Tennessee earning more than $500.
Loan eligibility is highly predictive of average loan size across all three specifica-
tions. While average loan amount is approximately constant between each two con-
secutive cutoffs, the typical loan increases approximately $25 at each $50 eligibility 
cutoff. It is also interesting to note that at lower cutoffs, borrowers take out loans 
VoL. 5 No. 4 267dobbie and skiba: information asymmetries in payday lending
that are near the maximum allowed level. The average loan size for borrowers earn-
ing just above the $100 cutoff is at or just above $100. In contrast, the typical debtor 
around higher cutoffs takes out loans that are significantly less than the maximum 
loan amount. The average loan size at the $500 cutoff, for example, is just over $300.
Table 2 presents formal estimates for the figures just described. The sample consists 
of first loans for borrowers with biweekly take-home pay between $100 and $1,100. 
Analogous to Figure 1, panel A, columns 1 and 2 control for income using a seventh-
order polynomial in net pay. Columns 3 and 4, corresponding to Figure 1, panel B, 
control for income using a linear spline. Columns 5 and 6 present results that are 
analogous to Figure 1, panel C, where we stack data from each cutoff and control 
for income using a linear trend and a linear trend interacted with earning above the 
loan-eligibility cutoff. The dependent variable is raw loan amount. All specifications 
control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects, with columns 5 and 6 adding 
controls for cutoff fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also control for age, race, gen-
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Figure 1. Loan Eligibility and Loan Amount in the Regression Discontinuity Sample
Notes: These figures plot average loan size and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression dis-
continuity sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who 
are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1,100. The smoothed line in panel A controls for a seventh-
order polynomial in net pay. Panel B controls for a linear spline in net pay. Panel C stacks data from each cutoff 
and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text 
for additional details.
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and  garnishment status. Observations from Firm B only control for age, the only 
 demographic  characteristic available. All specifications restrict the effect of each loan 
cutoff to have the same impact on loan size, and cluster standard errors at the pay level.
Consistent with the graphical evidence, loan eligibility is highly predictive of loan 
amount. Controlling for income using a seventh-order polynomial, borrowers with 
earnings just above a loan cutoff borrow $22.02 more than borrowers with earnings 
just below a cutoff. Adding controls for age, race, gender, marital status, credit score, 
and checking account balance leaves the results essentially unchanged. Controlling 
for income with a linear spline specification, the effect is $21.91. Stacking data from 
each cutoff, the effect is $19.63.
Our regression discontinuity estimates therefore imply that individuals in the payday 
market borrow $0.39 to $0.44 out of every additional dollar of available credit. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this suggests that payday borrowers are much more liquidity constrained 
than other individuals in the United States. For instance, Gross and Souleles (2002) find 
that a $1 increase in a credit card holder’s limit raises card spending by $0.10 to $0.14, 
and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find that households immediately consumed 
$0.20 to $0.40 cents for every $1 increase in their 2001 tax rebate.
Table 2—Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount
Polynomial Linear spline Local linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan eligibility 22.021*** 22.067*** 21.906*** 21.946*** 19.633*** 19.678***
(2.887) (2.902) (2.911) (2.930) (4.365) (2.523)
Age 0.026 0.025 0.020
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Black −12.250*** −12.382*** −12.527***
(4.613) (4.610) (4.606)
Male −2.217 −2.045 −2.084
(4.084) (4.086) (4.095)
Credit score −0.016* −0.016* −0.015*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Checkings 0.007* 0.007* 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Home owner 3.822 3.857 4.053
(4.823) (4.837) (4.829)
Direct deposit 0.869 0.814 0.885
(3.416) (3.412) (3.402)
Garnishment flag 7.809 8.111 8.804
(14.244) (14.237) (14.141)
Observations 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473
notes: This table reports regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of a $50 increase in loan eligibility on loan 
amount. The sample consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 incre-
ments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1,100 every two weeks. Columns 1 and 2 
control for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Columns 3 and 4 control for a linear spline in net pay. Columns 5 
and 6 stack data from each cutoff and control for net pay using a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. 
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of the borrower’s first loan. Loan eligibility indicates a $50 increase in 
payday loan eligibility. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Column 5 also controls 
for cutoff fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2 plots average loan size and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrow-
ers in our regression kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states 
offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semi-
monthly. We restrict the sample to borrowers earning more than $100, and less than 
the kink point plus $1,000. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being 
eligible for the maximum loan size in a state  c max  . That is, the fitted values for 
Figure 2 come from the following local linear specification:
(8)  L i =  α 0 +  α 1 ( pa y i −  c max ) +  β 1 1 { pa y i ≥  c max } ∙ ( pa y i −  c max ) +  ε i ,
estimated separately for borrowers in states with a $300 and $500 maximum loan size.
As expected given the loan-eligibility formula, Figure 2 shows very clear kinks 
in the empirical relationship between average loan size and biweekly earnings, with 
a sharp decrease in slope as earnings pass the loan-limit threshold. However, the 
relationship between loan amount and earnings before the kink is less than the 0.5 
predicted by the loan-eligibility formula, again suggesting that not all borrowers 
take out the maximum loan available. Loan size is also increasing in earnings after 
the kink point, suggesting that there is a slight positive relationship between under-
lying loan demand and earnings.5
5 Online Appendix Table 2 presents results estimating the association between borrower characteristics and loan 
choice in our regression discontinuity and regression kink samples. The dependent variable for each regression is an 
indicator for choosing the largest available loan. Thirty-three percent of borrowers in our regression  discontinuity 
Figure 2. Loan Eligibility and Loan Amount in the Regression Kink Sample
Notes: This figure plots average loan size and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in 
our regression kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday 
loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and paid more than $100 
and within $1,000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being 
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Table 3 presents formal regression kink estimates controlling for month-, year-, 
and state-of-loan effects. For borrowers in states capping loans at $300, loan amount 
increases by 29.4 cents for each additional dollar of earnings before the kink point, 
compared to only 3.7 cents after the kink point. In $500 cap states, loan amount 
increases by 28.6 cents for each additional dollar of earnings before the kink point, 
compared to only 3.5 cents after the kink point.
sample choose the largest available loan, as do 28 percent of borrowers in the regression kink sample. Online 
Appendix Table 2 shows that an additional $100 of biweekly pay is associated with a 7.4 to 7.6  percentage point 
decrease in the probability of choosing the largest loan in the regression discontinuity sample, and a 0.6 percentage 
point decrease in the regression kink sample. In both samples, borrowers who are older, white, and male are more 
likely to choose a larger loan. Borrowers with higher credit scores and lower checking account balances are also 
somewhat more likely to choose larger loans, though not all point estimates are statistically significant.
Table 3—Regression Kink Estimates  
of the Effect of Loan Eligibility on Loan Amount
$300 Cutoff $500 Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay × loan cap −0.257*** −0.256*** −0.251*** −0.249***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Pay 0.294*** 0.291*** 0.286*** 0.283***











Home owner — 11.669***
(1.416)




Observations 33,259 33,259 96,766 96,766
Notes: This table reports regression kink estimates of the impact of loan eligibility interacted 
with pay on loan amount. The sample consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in 
states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly 
earning more than $100 and within $1,000 of a kink point. Loan amount is limited to half of 
net pay up to the loan limit. Columns 1 and 2 include states with a $300 loan limit. Columns 3 
and 4 include states with a $500 loan limit. The dependent variable is the dollar amount of the 
borrower’s first loan. Loan cap is an indicator for eligibility for the largest loan available in a 
state. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by pay.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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B. moral Hazard
Figure 3, panels A– C plot default and biweekly pay for payday borrowers in our 
regression discontinuity sample. These figures represent the reduced-form impact of 
loan eligibility on default. Following the first-stage regression discontinuity results, 
each figure plots average loan amounts in $25 income bins for the first loans of bor-
rowers with biweekly take-home pay between $100 and $1,100. Figure 3, panel A 
plots fitted values controlling for income using a seventh-order polynomial. Figure 3, 
panel B plots fitted values using a linear spline. Figure 3, panel C plots residualized 
default rates after stacking data from each cutoff and controlling for income using a 
linear trend interacted with earning above the loan-eligibility cutoff. In sharp contrast 
to previous research, there is no evidence of moral hazard in our setting. In fact, default 
appears to be somewhat lower for borrowers with earnings just above loan cutoffs.
Table 4 presents formal two-stage least squares estimates of the causal impact of 
an additional $1 in loan amount on default. These two-stage least squares estimates 
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Figure 3. Loan Eligibility and Default in the Regression Discontinuity Sample
Notes: These panels plot average default and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression dis-
continuity sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who 
are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1,100. The smoothed line in panel A controls for a seventh-
order polynomial in net pay. Panel B controls for a linear spline in net pay. Panel C stacks data from each cutoff 
and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text 
for additional details.
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than the reduced-form results presented in Figure 3. All specifications instrument 
for loan amount using the maximum eligible loan, and control for month-, year-, and 
state-of-loan effects. Columns 5 and 6 control for cutoff fixed effects, with columns 2, 
4, and 6 controlling for age, race, gender, credit score, checking account balance, 
home ownership, direct-deposit status, and garnishment status. Observations from 
Firm B control for age, the only available demographic characteristic. All specifica-
tions restrict the effect of each loan cutoff to have the same impact on loan size and 
cluster standard errors at the pay level. The dependent variable in each specification 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the debtor defaults on their payday loan. We 
multiply all estimates by 100 so that each coefficient can be interpreted as the per-
centage change in the probability of default.
Our regression discontinuity results from Table 4 suggest that a larger loan 
decreases the probability that a payday borrower defaults on his first loan. Controlling 
for income using a seventh-order polynomial, a $1 larger loan is  associated with 
a 0.127 percentage point decrease in default. This implies that a $50 larger loan 
Table 4—Regression Discontinuity Estimates  
of the Effect of Loan Amount on Default
Polynomial Linear spline Local linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan amount −0.127** −0.113** −0.121** −0.123** −0.087* −0.098**
(0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051)
Age −0.462*** −0.461*** −0.462***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Black −1.507 −1.628 −1.336
(2.190) (2.210) (2.193)
Male 1.931 1.976 2.183
(1.958) (1.968) (1.935)
Credit score −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.044***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Checkings 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Home owner −1.406 −1.429 −1.525
(2.044) (2.064) (2.027)
Direct deposit 0.123 0.180 0.252
(1.671) (1.683) (1.655)
Garnishment flag 16.075** 16.542** 16.149**
(8.094) (8.151) (8.205)
Observations 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473
Notes: This table reports regression discontinuity estimates of loan amount on default. The 
sample consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in 
$50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1,100 every 
two weeks. Columns 1 and 2 control for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Columns 3 and 
4 control for a linear spline in net pay. Columns 5 and 6 stack data from each cutoff and control 
for net pay using a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. The dependent variable is 
an indicator for bouncing a check on the first loan. All regressions instrument for loan amount 
using loan eligibility and control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Columns 5 and 6 
also control for cutoff fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. Coefficients and stan-
dard errors are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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(e.g., the typical increase in loan eligibility) is associated with a 6.35 percent-
age point decrease in default, a 32 percent decrease from the mean default rate of 
19.47 percent. Controlling for income with a linear spline specification, a $50 larger 
loan lowers default by 6.05 percentage points, a 31 percent decrease. Stacking data 
from each cutoff, the effect of a $50 larger loan is 4.35 percentage points, a 22 per-
cent drop in the probability of default in our regression discontinuity sample.
Figure 4 plots default and biweekly pay for payday borrowers in our regression 
kink sample. Following the first-stage results, there is a clear kink in the empirical 
relationship between default and biweekly earnings, with a sharp decrease in slope 
as earnings pass the loan-limit threshold. This pattern is consistent with larger loans 
decreasing the probability of default.
Table 5 presents formal two-stage least squares estimates of the causal impact 
of an additional $1 in loan amount on default using our regression kink design. We 
instrument for loan amount using the interaction between pay and the kink point, 
and use a local linear control specification to control for pay. We also control for 
month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects, and multiply all estimates by 100. In our 
regression kink specification, a $1 larger loan is associated with a 0.09 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of default at the $300 cutoff and a 0.03 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of default at the $500 cutoff. This implies that a $50 
larger loan is associated with a 4.55 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
default at the $300 cutoff, a 21.9 percent drop, and a 1.60 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of default at the $500 cutoff, a 17.2 percent drop. It is worth 
emphasizing the similarity of our regression discontinuity and regression kink point 
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Figure 4. Loan Eligibility and Default in the Regression Kink Sample
Notes: This figure plots default and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regres-
sion kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 
or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and paid more than $100 and within 
$1,000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being eligible for 
the maximum loan size in a state. See text for additional details. 
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Table 6 and Table 7 report regression discontinuity and regression kink esti-
mates interacted with borrower age, gender, race, baseline home ownership, 
baseline credit score, and baseline checking account balance. We focus on our 
regression kink results, where the larger sample size allows for increased preci-
sion. We follow our earlier specifications by controlling for a local linear trend in 
pay and month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. We instrument for loan size using 
the triple interaction of pay with the loan kink point and the relevant borrower 
characteristic. We dichotomize all borrower characteristics by splitting the sample 
at the median. Finally, we restrict our attention to the $500 kink point, as we do 
not have information on borrower characteristics for borrowers in the $300 kink 
point states.
The effect of loan size on default is larger for borrowers who are younger and 
who are male. A $50 increase in loan size decreases the probability that a borrower 
under 40 years old defaults by 2.2 percentage points, compared to only 0.6 percent-
age points for borrowers over 40. A $50 increase in loan size also decreases the 
Table 5—Regression Kink Estimates of the Effect of Loan Amount on Default
$300 Cutoff $500 Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan amount −0.091*** −0.088*** −0.032*** −0.028***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Pay −0.009*** −0.007*** 0.001 0.003***











Home owner — −0.956***
(0.355)




Observations 33,259 33,259 96,766 96,766
Notes: This table reports regression kink estimates of loan amount on default. The sample con-
sists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 
increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1,000 
of a kink point. Columns 1 and 2 include states with a $300 loan limit. Columns 3 and 4 include 
states with a $500 loan limit. The dependent variable is an indicator for default on the first loan. 
All regressions instrument for loan amount using an indicator for eligibility for the largest loan 
available in a state and control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Coefficients and 
robust standard errors are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6—Regression Discontinuity Subsample Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Loan amount −0.120** −0.527 0.032 −0.008 0.007 0.095 0.274
(0.051) (0.450) (0.101) (0.073) (0.100) (0.149) (0.668)
Loan amount × over 40 −0.039
(0.042)
Loan amount × high credit score 0.020
(0.028)
Loan amount × high checking −0.021
(0.025)
Loan amount × male 0.011
(0.037)
Loan amount × black −0.006
(0.037)
Loan amount × home owner −0.006
(0.062)
Observations 9,473 9,443 2,165 2,274 1,316 1,316 1,160
Notes: This table reports regression discontinuity estimates interacted with borrower characteristics. The sample 
consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid 
biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1,100 every two weeks, and who report information on the 
relevant characteristic. The dependent variable is an indicator for bouncing a check on the first loan. All regressions 
instrument for loan amount using loan eligibility interacted with the relevant characteristic and control for a sev-
enth-order polynomial in net pay, the borrower characteristic, and month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by pay. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 7—Regression Kink Subsample Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Loan amount −0.032*** −0.044*** −0.029*** −0.034*** −0.010 −0.014** −0.053***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Loan amount 0.032***
 × over 40 (0.008)
Loan amount −0.001
 × high credit score (0.008)
Loan amount 0.012
 × high checking (0.008)
Loan amount × male −0.023*
(0.012)
Loan amount × black −0.012
(0.012)
Loan amount 0.020
 × home owner (0.016)
Observations 96,766 96,631 91,261 89,844 40,878 40,878 34,133
Notes: This table reports regression kink estimates interacted with borrower characteristics. The sample consists 
of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid 
biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1,000 of a kink point who report information on the 
relevant characteristic. The dependent variable is an indicator for bouncing a check on the first loan. All regressions 
instrument for loan amount using an indicator for eligibility for the largest loan available in a state interacted with 
characteristic listed in the left-most column, and control for pay interacted with the listed characteristic, and month-, 
year-, and state-of-loan effects. Coefficients and robust standard errors are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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probability that a male borrower under 40 years old defaults by 1.65 percentage 
points, compared to only 0.05 percentage points for female borrowers. However, 
both younger borrowers and male borrowers are more likely to default in general, 
implying that the relative effect of loan size on default is comparable between the 
different groups.
More striking is the lack of difference between borrowers with high and low 
baseline credit scores and high and low baseline checking account balances. In 
both cases, the interaction term is economically small and not statistically signifi-
cant. This suggests that the impact of loan size on repayment behavior is similar 
across high- and low-risk individuals. This pattern of results is also consistent 
with the regression kink estimates from Table 5 showing similar impacts at the 
$300 and $500 kink points, despite large differences in the type of borrowers on 
those margins.
Table 8—OLS Estimates of the Effect of Loan Amount on Default
RD sample RK sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan 0.020*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.008*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.029***
 amount (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Biweekly −0.023*** −0.019*** 0.009 −0.012*** −0.009*** −0.007***
 pay (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age −0.466*** −0.465*** −0.303*** −0.303***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.008) (0.008)
Black 0.472 0.408 3.151*** 3.161***
(1.997) (1.997) (0.266) (0.266)
Male 2.337 2.440 2.432*** 2.511***
(1.878) (1.880) (0.285) (0.285)
Credit score −0.041*** −0.042*** −0.018*** −0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Checkings −0.001 −0.001 −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Home owner −2.011 −2.053 −1.276*** −1.277***
(1.905) (1.907) (0.340) (0.340)
Direct 0.082 −0.175 −2.377*** −2.221***
 deposit (1.576) (1.575) (0.258) (0.258)
Garnishment 15.522* 15.410* 0.155 0.119
(8.191) (8.261) (1.076) (1.076)
Loan −2.943*** −0.525***
 eligibility (0.873) (0.081)
R2 0.028 0.039 0.066 0.067 0.037 0.048 0.066 0.067
Observations 9,473 9,473 9,473 9,473 130,025 130,025 130,025 130,025
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the cross-sectional correlation between loan amount and default. The 
regression discontinuity (RD) sample consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday 
loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1,100 every two weeks. 
The regression kink (RK) sample consists of first-time payday loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans 
in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1,000 of a kink 
point. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Coefficients and robust standard errors 
are multiplied by 100.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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C. Adverse selection
Table 8 presents OLS estimates relating default to loan size. Recall that these 
cross-sectional estimates combine the causal impact of loan size with the selection 
of borrowers into different size loans. Under our identifying assumptions discussed 
in Section III, the magnitude of adverse selection is the coefficient from our OLS 
regressions minus the impact of moral hazard implied by Tables 4 and 5.
Following our earlier results, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal 
to one if a loan ends in default. All specifications control for month-, year-, and 
state-of-loan effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses and multiply 
all coefficients and standard errors by 100. Columns 1 and 5 present our baseline 
results using data from both firms in our sample and no controls other than month-, 
year-, and state-of-loan fixed effects. Columns 2 and 6 add controls for net pay. 
Columns 3 and 7 add controls for age, race, gender, marriage, credit score, and 
checking account balance. Columns 4 and 8 add controls for the maximum loan a 
borrower is eligible for. Observations from Firms B and C only control for age and 
the maximum loan available, as other demographic controls are not available.
Consistent with the view that information frictions lead to credit constraints in equi-
librium, there is a positive association between loan size and the probability of default. 
Scaling the estimates to be equivalent to our two-stage least squares results, a $50 
increase in loan size is associated with a 1.0 percentage point increase in the probability 
of default in our regression discontinuity sample, and a 0.4 percentage point increase in 
the probability of default in our regression kink sample. Controlling only for biweekly 
pay, a $50 increase in loan size is associated with a 2.3 percentage point increase in 
the probability of default in our regression discontinuity sample, and a 1.3 percentage 
point increase in our regression kink sample. Controlling for borrower characteristics 
and loan eligibility yields similar results to those that control for pay only.
Taken together with our moral hazard estimates discussed above, our results from 
Table 8 imply that borrowers who select a $50 larger loan are 5.4 to 8.65 percentage 
points more likely to default on their first payday loan in our regression discontinu-
ity sample, and 2.00 to 5.85 percentage points more likely to default in our regres-
sion kink sample. These represent a 28 to 44 percent increase in the probability of 
default in our discontinuity sample, and a 16 to 47 percent increase in our regression 
kink sample. The precision of both our two-stage least squares and OLS estimates 
results in our adverse selection estimates also being highly statistically significant, 
with p-values of less than 0.001 across all specifications.
d. specification Checks
This section presents results from a series of specification checks for our regres-
sion discontinuity and regression kink estimates. First, we test the assumption that 
individuals do not selectively borrow based on loan eligibility. Second, we replicate 
our results in states without the discontinuity as a more general falsification test.
Our first set of specification checks examines the assumption that individuals 
eligible for larger loans are not more or less likely to borrow. Such selective bor-
rowing could invalidate our empirical design by creating discontinuous differences 
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in borrower characteristics around the eligibility cutoffs. Although the continuity 
assumption cannot be fully tested, its validity can be evaluated by testing whether 
the observable characteristics of borrowers trend smoothly through the cutoffs and 
by testing the density of borrowers around the cutoffs.
Online Appendix Figure 1, panel A plots observable borrower characteristics and 
biweekly pay for borrowers in our regression discontinuity sample. Following our 
earlier results, we also plot predicted lines controlling for a seventh-order polyno-
mial in pay, a linear spline in pay, and a local linear line stacking data from each 
eligibility cutoff. There is little evidence of the type of systematic selection that 
would bias our results. Borrower characteristics appear to trend smoothly through 
each cutoff.
Online Appendix Table 3 presents formal results testing whether observable base-
line characteristics trend smoothly through the loan-eligibility cutoffs. We regress 
each baseline characteristic on the maximum loan for which a borrower is eligible, 
controlling for income and month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Consistent with 
the results from online Appendix Figure 1, panel A, none of the point estimates are 
statistically significant in any of the three specifications we consider.
Online Appendix Figure 1, panel B plots the number of borrowers and biweekly 
pay for our regression discontinuity sample. The bottom row of online Appendix 
Table 3 presents formal estimates testing whether the number of borrowers trends 
smoothly through the loan-eligibility cutoffs. Specifically, we regress the number 
of borrowers in each $10 bin on a seventh-order polynomial in pay, a linear spline 
in pay, and local linear in pay stacking data from each cutoff. Consistent with our 
identifying assumptions, none of these specifications suggest that the number of 
borrowers changes with loan eligibility. Results are identical across a range of speci-
fications and choice of binwidth.
Online Appendix Figure 2, panel A and online Appendix Table 4 present results 
testing whether observable characteristics trend smoothly in our regression kink 
sample. Following our earlier results, we also plot predicted lines controlling for pay 
interacted with the kink point. The results from online Appendix Figure 2, panel A 
suggest that the fraction of borrowers who are black trends down after the kink 
point. There are also changes in direct deposit and garnishment. Conversely, gender, 
credit score, checking account balance, home ownership, and age all appear to trend 
smoothly through the kink point. Formal estimates available in online Appendix 
Table 4 further suggest we cannot rule out economically small differences at the 
kink point for a number of characteristics. Thus, our regression kink estimates 
should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Online Appendix Figure 2, panel B plots the number of borrowers and biweekly 
pay for our regression kink sample. We also plot a predicted line from a seventh-
order polynomial interacted with the kink point, the polynomial order that has the 
lowest Akaike criterion. The bottom row of online Appendix Table 4 presents formal 
estimates from the same specification. Following Card et al. (2012) we report the 
coefficient and standard error on the linear interaction term. There is no evidence 
that the number of borrowers changes at the kink point, with the results from online 
Appendix Table 4 ruling out even modest selection into or out of the sample around 
the kink point.
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We conclude this section by considering a more general falsification test of our 
regression discontinuity design. To ensure that our estimates identify discontinuities 
in loan size and default that exist due to institutional rules determining loan eligibil-
ity, we replicate our main results in our regression kink sample, where loan size is 
not a discontinuous function of income before the kink point. As in the rest of our 
results, we restrict this falsification sample to biweekly borrowers with take-home 
pay between $100 and $1,100. These restrictions leave us with a large sample of 
101,026 borrowers.
The first-stage estimates from our falsification test are presented in online 
Appendix Figure 3 with corresponding regression results in online Appendix 
Table 5. There is no evidence of an economically or statistically significant rela-
tionship between income and loan size in our falsification sample of states where 
loan size is not institutionally set to be a discontinuous function of pay. Loan 
amount trends smoothly through each cutoff, with the first-stage point estimates 
ranging from 1.65 to 2.75, with none of the point estimates reaching statistical 
significance.
Reduced-form estimates from our falsification test are presented in online 
Appendix Figure 4 and online Appendix Table 6. Again, there is no evidence of an 
economically or statistically significant relationship between pay and default in the 
falsification sample. Default trends smoothly through each cutoff, with none of the 
two-stage least squares estimates suggesting a statistically significant relationship 
between loan size and default.
V. Discussion
This paper has presented evidence that larger payday loan amounts decrease the 
probability of payday loan default. This is a surprising result given the prominence 
of moral hazard in the theoretical literature and the empirical relevance of moral 
hazard in other consumer-lending markets (e.g., Adams, Einav, and Levin 2009). 
There are at least five potential reasons why moral hazard is not empirically relevant 
in payday lending.
First, it is possible that borrowers repay larger loans to maintain a larger credit 
line in the future. In this scenario, the marginal benefit of a higher credit line tomor-
row is larger than the marginal benefit of defaulting on a larger loan today. This 
scenario also assumes that it is prohibitively costly for borrowers to increase their 
credit line in other ways, such as increasing earnings to qualify for a larger loan or 
petitioning the lender for an exemption. Payday firms in our sample report that they 
offer these types of exemptions on second loans, suggesting that this mechanism is 
unlikely to play an important role in explaining our results.
Second, borrowers may fear more aggressive collection efforts if they default 
on a larger loan. If lenders are able to increase the cost of default sufficiently, the 
marginal cost of default may increase faster with loan size than the marginal benefit 
does. Conversely, the payday firms in our sample have no official policy of pursu-
ing larger loans more aggressively, and there is no evidence that payday lenders are 
more effective at collecting larger loans in our sample. However, we are unable to 
rule out differences in borrower beliefs regarding collection efforts.
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Third, larger loans may increase the ability of borrowers to repay in the future. 
For example, if electricity or telephone service is shut off, the time and expense to 
restart service can exceed the payday loan fees. A larger payday loan may also allow 
an individual to fix her car and stay employed, or pay rent or her mortgage and avoid 
eviction or foreclosure. Consistent with this mechanism, approximately one-half 
of payday borrowers report that they plan to use their loan for bills, emergencies, 
transportation expenses, food, or to repay another debt (Bertrand and Morse 2011). 
In a separate sample, approximately one-half of payday borrowers report that they 
plan to use their loan to deal with an unexpected expense shock, while another fifth 
report that they plan to use their loan to deal with an unexpected income shock. Only 
one-third of payday borrowers plan to use their loan for a discretionary expense 
(Elliehausen and Lawrence 2001).
Fourth, it is possible that individuals who do not qualify for a large enough loan 
substitute toward even more costly forms of credit that makes it more difficult to 
repay. Many sources of short-term credit are more expensive than payday loans, 
including overdraft charges on a checking account, returned check fees, credit card 
late fees, and automobile title loans. Consistent with this explanation, Skiba and 
Tobacman (2011) find that rejected payday loan applicants are more likely to take 
out a pawn loan. This is likely because 80 percent of payday applicants have pre-
cisely $0 in available credit card liquidity at the time of application, with 90 percent 
having less than $300 in liquidity when they apply (Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman 
2012).
Finally, our results are consistent with a number of alternative models of decision 
making.6 For instance, if borrowers suffer from limited attention, they may be more 
likely to repay larger loans due to their increased salience. Forward-looking borrow-
ers suffering from limited attention problems may also be more likely to set remind-
ers or seek commitment devices to repay larger loans (O’Donoghue and Rabin 
2001). It is also possible that payday borrowers discount smaller dollar amounts 
more than larger amounts (i.e., the magnitude effect discussed by Loewenstein and 
Prelec 1992).
VI. Conclusion
This paper exploits sharp discontinuities in loan eligibility to test for moral haz-
ard and adverse selection in the payday loan market, one of the largest sources of 
subprime credit in the United States. Both regression discontinuity and regression 
kink approaches suggest that payday loan borrowers are less likely to default when 
offered a larger loan. A $50 larger payday loan leads to a 17 to 33 percent drop in 
the probability of default on the first loan. Conversely, we find evidence of economi-
cally and statistically significant adverse selection into larger payday loans when 
loan eligibility is held constant. Payday borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 
16 to 44 percent more likely to default on the first loan.
6 Campbell et al. (2011) discuss behavioral anomalies in the payday loan market. See Rabin (1998) and 
DellaVigna (2009) for a broader discussion of potential deviations from the neoclassical model of decision making.
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Given the emphasis placed on moral hazard by policymakers and within the theo-
retical literature, our results are somewhat surprising. We hope that our findings spur 
new work estimating the impact of moral hazard in other settings and continue to 
explore new identification strategies as we have done here. Our work also highlights 
the significant adverse selection problems facing firms in the payday loan market. 
Improved screening strategies or information sharing may play an important role in 
alleviating these frictions.
With that said, the welfare effects of resolving information frictions in the payday 
loan market are still unknown, as we cannot say with certainty what is driving our 
effects. A better understanding of which model of decision making best charac-
terizes the behavior of credit constrained borrowers would go a long way toward 
addressing this issue. We view the parsing out of these various mechanisms, both 
theoretically and empirically, as an important area for future research.
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